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THE SOFTWARE FORMERLY KNOWN AS
"CARNIVORE": WHEN DOES E-MAIL
SURVEILLANCE ENCROACH UPON A
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY?
Ways may some day be developed by which the Government,
without removingpapers from secret drawers, can reproduce
them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to a
jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.'
I. INTRODUCTION
What was once known as "Carnivore" is now called DCS1000, short for
digital collection system.2 It is the FBI's latest e-mail surveillance
technology-a software program housed in a computer unit and attached to an
Internet service provider, such as America Online.3 Once attached, Carnivore
has the capability of filtering all e-mail sent through a data access point.4
Theoretically, the software targets and collects only those e-mail
communications subject to a court order while ignoring e-mails sent by the
public at large.5 In other words, it gets to the "meat" of a suspect's e-mail
communication.6 However, privacy advocates wonder if some of the meat
Carnivore devours is an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.
Due to the fluid and evolving nature of the FBI's snooping software, this
Comment focuses on the Carnivore version reviewed by an independent report
in Fall 2000.' Because software can evolve virtually overnight, this Comment
will focus both specifically on the Carnivore software and generally on e-mail
snooping surveillance.
1. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. This Comment will refer to DCS 1000 as Carnivore. The FBI changed the name because
"[t]he name Carnivore contributed to some perceptions that the application was a predatory
program that could invade citizens' privacy." Matt McLaughlin, FBI's Upgrade of Carnivore
Includes a New Name, GOV'T COMPUTER NEws (Feb. 12, 2001), at
http://www.gcn.com/vollnol/ndaily-updates/366-1.html.
3. See FBI, Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, Large Chart Description, in FBI PROGRAMS AND
INITIATIVES, at http://www.fbi.gov/programslcamivorelcarnlrgmap.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2001) [hereinafter Chart Description].
4. Id.
5. See IIT RESEARCH INST., INDEPENDENTTECHNICALREVIEW OF THE CARNIVORE SYSTEM:
FINAL REPORT 1-1 (Dec. 8, 2000), available at http://www.cdt.org/security/camivore/
00121carniv final.pdf [hereinafter IITRI REPORT].
6. Neil King, Jr. & Ted Bridis, FBI's Wiretaps to Scan E-Mail Spark Concern, WALL ST.
J., July 11, 2000, at A3.
7. See IITRI REPORT, supra note 5.
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This Comment attempts to delineate the expectations of privacy an
individual has when using the Internet and determine whether Carnivore or
other Internet surveillance software violates these expectations. E-mail
"snoopers" possibly violate expectations of privacy in two ways: (1) by
collecting too much information while operating in pen-trap mode; and (2) by
possessing an inherent potential for abuse. Part II provides an introduction to
Carnivore and sketches the Fourth Amendment's reasonable expectation of
privacy and how it relates to e-mail. Part III analyzes Carnivore and concludes
the following: (1) the current pen-trap mode operation is not statutorily
authorized; (2) the pen-trap mode operation intrudes upon a reasonable
expectation of privacy by collecting too much information; and (3) although the
current software falls short of an Orwellian-type device, it nevertheless should
be used only in extraordinary or emergency situations in order to reduce the
potential for abuse.
II. BACKGROUND
"Big Brother Is Watching You..
A. What is Carnivore?
Carnivore is an e-mail surveillance software created by the FBI "to combat
terrorism, espionage, information warfare, child pornography, serious fraud,
and other felonies."9 The software is housed in a computer and connected to an
Internet service provider (ISP) such as AOL, Earthlink, or Prodigy. The ISP
then provides the FBI with an access point containing all traffic from the
suspect." Using a one-way tapping device, all data at the access point is
copied." Carnivore then filters this copied data, sniffing out and retrieving
"packets" of information that are subject to court orders while theoretically
rejecting all extraneous data. 2 FBI administrators have the ability to calibrate
Carnivore to capture packets based on Internet Protocol (IP) address or e-mail
username. 3 "Packets can be recorded in their entirety (full mode) or recording
can be limited to addressing information (pen mode), i.e., IP addresses and
usernames."'
14
8. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 1 (First Plume Printing 1983) (1949).
9. IITRIREPORT, supra note 5, at 1-1; FBI, Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, in FBIPROGRAMS
ANDINMATIMs, athttp://www.fbi.gov/programs/camivoreleamivore2.htm (last visited Feb. 21,
2001) [hereinafter Carnivore Diagnostic Tool].
10. See Chart Description, supra note 3 (noting that in some cases, the ISP is able to
provide an access point containing only the suspect's traffic).
11. Id.
12. IITRI REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-1.
13. Id.
14. Id.
[Vol. 52: 875
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All captured data is saved on a removable Jaz disk."5 The disk is locked
behind a panel in the housing computer and can only be lawfully removed by
authorized FBI personnel. 6 When a disk is removed, it is placed in a sealed
container and taken to the judge who issued the court order. 7
The housing computer is installed without a keyboard or monitor." Once
installed, it is controlled remotely via a telephone link using a 56-kbps
modem."' The software is capable of operating in two modes: (1) pen-trap
mode, which collects addressing information;2" or (2) full-content mode, which
can capture virtually all the suspect's Internet communications. 2' The legal
standards authorizing the different modes vary, with pen-trap authorization
being easier to obtain.'
The controversy surrounding Carnivore became public on July 11, 2000,
through an article published in the Wall Street Journal.' The article stated,
"[W]hen deployed, [Carnivore] must be hooked directly into Internet service
providers' computer networks. That would give the government, at least
theoretically, the ability to eavesdrop on all customers' digital communications,
from e-mail to online banking and Web surfing.' ,2 4 Not surprisingly, the
suggested scope and potential intrusiveness of the technology concerned
privacy advocates.' The day after the article ran, the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (EPIC) filed a lawsuit seeking disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act' and an injunction to prevent the use of Carnivore
until further review.27 The FBI countered by claiming Carnivore was authorized
to: (1) collect TO and FROM information under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), s which regulates pen-trap
devices; (2) conduct full content searches under Title III of the Omnibus Crime
15. Id. at 3-12.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. IITRI REPORT, supra note 5, at 3-12.
19. Id.
20. Id. at I-I. In the case of e-mail, this addressing information will be the usernames from
the TO and FROM fields; in other words, an e-mail address or a list of addresses. Id. at viii, 1-1.
21. Id. at viii and 1-1.
22. See discussion infra Part LlI.B.
23. See King & Bridis, supra note 6, at A3.
24. Id.
25. According to Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director of the ACLU, using Carnivore "is
comparable to allowing government agents to rip open Post Office mailbags and scan every
piece of mail in search of one specific letter whose address they already know." Press Release,
ACLU, ACLU Urges Congress to Put a Leash on "Carnivore" and Other Government Snoopware
Programs (July 12, 2000), at http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/n071200b.html.
26. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
27. See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep't of Justice, No. 00-1849 JR (D.D.C. filed July 12,
2000).
28. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (1994); see generally HTRI REPORT, supra note 5, at 3-1 to
3-3 (setting forth the legal framework which justifies the use of Carnivore).
2001)
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Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III);29 and (3) conduct surveillance
of foreign powers and agents under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (FISA).a0
In October 2000 the United States Justice Department appointed an
independent panel ofexperts from the Illinois Institute of Technology Research
Institute (IITRI) to review Carnivore.3 On December 8, 2000, the IITRI
concluded that when used pursuant to a Title III court order, Carnivore
provides no information beyond the scope of a warrant, and when used under
pen-trap authorization, it possibly exceeds court-permitted collection.32 This
report, however, failed to close the book on the surveillance software. Indeed,
some have questioned just how independent the review actually was33 and
whether the report contained improper conclusions of law. 4
B. What is a Reasonable Expectation ofPrivacy?
Although not explicit in the United States Constitution, a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists in the context of the Fourth Amendment's right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In Katz v. United States,6
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1994).
30. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1994).
31. See IITRI REPORT, supra note 5, at vii.
32. Id. at xii.
33. See David McGuire, Positive 'Carnivore 'ReviewDrawsImmediateFire, NEWSBYTES,
Dec. 14, 2000, at http://www.newsbytes.com/news/00/159442.html (quoting House Majority
Leader Dick Armey, R-Texas, who stated, "[t]his review by a team with clear ties to this
administration raises more concerns than it answers"); Barry Steinhart & Christopher Chiu,
ACLU Comments Regarding Carnivore Review Team Draft Report, at
http://www.aclu.org/news/2000/carnivorecomments.html (ast visited Jan 17, 2001).
34. See Letter from David L. Sobel, General Counsel, EPIC, to Carnivore Review Panel,
U.S. Department of Justice (Dec. 1, 2000), at http://www.epic.org/privacy/camivore
/reviewcomments.html (arguing that the IITRI team undertook a purely technical review of
Carnivore, yet made conclusions regarding both technical and legal issues).
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... ."). In Olmstead v. United States Justice Brandeis stated the following:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit ofhappiness .... They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever
the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Although Justice
Brandeis's dissenting opinion was ahead of its time, the U.S. Supreme Court in Katz v. United
States essentially adopted his view that an element of privacy exists in the Fourth Amendment.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304
(1967) ("We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection
of privacy .... ).
36. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
[Vol. 52: 875
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the United States Supreme Court accepted this view by declaring "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places."37 In Katz the Court held that
recording Katz's telephone conversations in aphone booth constituted a search
under the Fourth Amendment because the conduct "violated the privacy upon
which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth . . . ."' Although
the Katz majority opinion did not mention the phrase "reasonable expectation
of privacy," Justice Harlan formulated a test in his concurrence for measuring
this expectation.3
Under Justice Harlan's test a search violates a person's reasonable
expectation of privacy if (1) the person has exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and (2) that expectation is one which society recognizes
as reasonable (objective).' Justice Harlan, however, later de-emphasized the
importance of a subjective expectation of privacy.4' Moreover, he suggested an
expectation must be more than merely reasonable; something else was
required.42 He proposed the "something else" was a balancing of "the nature of
a particular practice and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense
of security balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law
enforcement."
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have held that the reasonableness of a
search, and whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists, is determined by
balancing the needs of the government versus the rights of a particular
individual." Thus, an individual may possess an expectation of privacy, but this
expectation is unreasonable if the court concludes that the governmental
interest outweighs the individual's privacy interest.45 When an individual's
expectation of privacy is deemed unreasonable, the Fourth Amendment
provides no protection, regardless of whether a warrant was properly
37. Id. at 351; see also Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman "'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or
Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM.L. REv. 1751,1756 (1994) (arguing
that "[b]y declaring that 'the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,' the Katz Court
effectively tied the Amendment's core meaning to the citizenry's 'reasonable expectation[s] of
privacy"').
38. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
39. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
40. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where
he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of
outsiders are not 'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.").
41. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The
analysis must, in my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations... [because] [o]ur
expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules
the customs and values of the past and present.").
42. Id.; see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 134-35 (3d ed. 2000)
(tracing the development of Justice Harlan's test).
43. White, 401 U.S. at 786.
44. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 555 (1976); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21(1968).
45. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 314 (1997).
2001]
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obtained.' However, if an individual's expectation is reasonable, the Fourth
Amendment provides protection from police intrusion absent a warrant
supported by probable cause. 7
Finding bright guidelines for this balancing test has proved elusive.
Nevertheless, delineations of what is considered a reasonable expectation of
privacy, however vague, can be placed on a spectrum,"8 and the Court will
recognize those expectations as either legitimate, diminished, or altogether
nonexistent."9 On one end of this spectrum are situations where an individual
experiences the greatest expectation of privacy. Thus, legitimate expectations
are found, for example, in the privacy of one's home, especially at night,5" or
in one's personal effects."' In the middle of this spectrum are instances where
an individual experiences a diminished expectation, such as in a car 2 or at a
business establishment.53 However, perhaps thebest way to define a reasonable
expectation of privacy is to examine those situations where there is no
legitimate expectation. Thus, the Supreme Court has found, for example, there
is no reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of a conversation
46. See White, 401 U.S. at 748.
47. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
48. It should be noted that Fourth Amendment case law is very complex. Indeed, one
professor has commented: "Fourth Amendment case law is a sinking ocean liner-rudderless
and badly off course-yet most scholarship contents itself with rearranging the deck chairs."
Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 (1994).
Because this Comment focuses narrowly on the Fourth Amendment in relation to e-mail and an
e-mail snooping system, only a very rough sketch of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is
provided.
49. Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of
Privacy, " 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1302 (198 1) (arguing that the United States Supreme Court
has developed a graduated approach based upon degrees of privacy expectations).
50. See Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 462 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("[T]here is no expectation of privacy more reasonable and more demanding of constitutional
protection than our right to expect that we will be let alone in the privacy of our homes during
the night.").
51. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 336-37 (2000) (finding that a traveler's
personal luggage is an "effect" protected by the Fourth Amendment, and the individual
possessed a privacy interest in his bag).
52. Compare Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (reasoning that because people
experience a greater sense ofprivacy while in a car than walking on the street, an individual does
not sacrifice all expectations of privacy merely because driving a car is regulated) with United
States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) ("A person traveling in an automobile on public
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another." (emphasis added)).
53. Compare See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,543 (1967) ("The businessman, like the
occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from
unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property.") with Minnesota v. Carter
525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) ("'An expectation of privacy in commercial premises, however, is
different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's home."' (quoting
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987))).
[Vol. 52: 875
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divulged to a third party,54 in something knowingly exposed to the public,5 or
in the garbage on the side of the street. 6
C. A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy While Using E-Mail
Electronic mail, commonly known as "e-mail," is a medium of
communication transmitted via computers connected over either the Internet
(World Wide Web) or an intranet (your office system). 7 In many respects, e-
mail is a hybrid of the postal mail and the telephone. Communication via e-mail
is similar to postal mail because both (1) are written communications; (2) allow
for the attachment of items, such as files or pictures; (3) lack voice inflection,
which affects the recipient's ability to judge the tone of the communication;
and (4) cannot be retracted once sent. On the other hand, e-mail is similar to a
phone call because the communication is virtually instantaneous and is
electronic, meaning it is capable of being intercepted by electronic means.
Understanding how an e-mail message is sent and received requires a
cursory understanding of how the Internet works. The Internet is basically "a
network of networks." ' Rather than a physical entity, it is "a giant network
which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer
networks." 59 Because the smaller networks are owned by various individuals
or organizations, public and private, the Internet is essentially a decentralized,
global cyberspace that links the entire world.'
When an e-mail is sent via the Internet, the message is not sent as a whole
entity; rather, it is divided into a series of "packets" which are reassembled at
the receiving end.6' These packets may take many and varying paths to their
destination."2 If certain computers along the path become overloaded, some
packets will travel through less congested computers.63 Because e-mail is not
54. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (reasoning that an individual
cannot reasonably assume that the person with whom she is conversing will not later divulge that
conversation to the police).
55. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) ("What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected." (internal citations omitted)).
56. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35,40-41 (1988) (reasoning that when aperson
places garbage on the street, she expressly places it there to be available to the public-such as
children, scavengers, or the sanitation department).
57. See Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, INTERET Soc'Y 3, at
http:l/www.isoc.orglintemetlhistorylbrief.html (last modified Aug. 4,2000).
58. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
59. Id.; see generally Leiner et al., supra note 57 (tracing the development of the Internet
and its accompanying technology).
60. See ACLU, 929 F. Supp at 831.
61. Id. at 832.
62. Id.
63. Id.
2001]
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sealed or secure, intermediate computers may be used to access or. view the
message, unless it is encrypted.'
The first federal appellate court to address the issue of an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy in the use of e-mail was the Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces.6 In United States v. Maxwell the appellant had been
convicted of knowingly transporting or receiving child pornography in
violation of the Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children Act of
1978.6 The appellant was discovered by an FBI sting that targeted a child
pornography ring operating on the Internet service provider America Online
(AOL).67 On the one hand, the court found that the appellant "possessed a
reasonable expectation of privacy, albeit a limited one," in the e-mails he sent
via AOL." The court stressed that these e-mail messages were privately stored
by AOL,69 thus affording more protection than, for example, an e-mail
transmitted at work. The court, however, also determined that expectations of
privacy depend on the type of e-mail used and on the indentity of the intended
recipient.7" Thus, the court found that "[m]essages sent to the public at large in
the 'chat room' or e-mail that is 'forwarded' from correspondent to
correspondent [lose] any semblance of privacy."'"
In United States v. Monroe," the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces, while acknowledging its holding in Maxwell, found the
appellant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his e-mail messages that
were viewed by Air Force personnel who maintained the network system.73 In
distinguishing Monroe from the holding in Maxwell, the court noted that in
Maxwell, AOL contractually agreed not to disclose subscribers' e-mail.74 Thus,
e-mails sent at work or through the Internet itself, absent contractual
64. Id.
65. United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995), rev'd in part, 45
M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
66. Id. at 410; 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1994).
67. See Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 411-14. The appellant's AOL communications were seized
subject to a warrant; however, the warrant was issued to search transmissions by an individual
identified by the username "REDDEL," rather than by the actual name the appellant used, which
was "Reddel ," as in "Ready One." Id. at 413. In anticipation of the search warrant, AOL created
software to help assist the search. Id. In doing so, AOL actually compiled a list of names which
included the appellant's name, "Reddel," although this actual name never appeared on the
warrant. Id. The appellant argued that AOL used its software before the search warrant was
actually issued, and therefore, had such use not occurred, the FBI would have never identified
him, for they only had the name "REDDEL." Id.
68. Id. at417.
69. Id. (reasoning that "e-mail messages are afforded more privacy than similar messages
on the Internet, because they are privately stored for retrieval on AOL's centralized and
privately-owned computer bank").
70. Id. at 418-19.
71. Id. at419.
72. 52 M.J. 326 (C.A.A.F. 1999).
73. Id. at330.
74. Id.
[Vol. 52: 875
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guarantees, experience a diminished degree of protection from the Fourth
Amendment.
75
In sum, the use of e-mail falls into the middle of the spectrum-a
diminished expectation of privacy. On the one hand, the use of e-mail is
generally subject to the same Fourth Amendment protections found in the use
of the telephone and postal mail,76 and the sender of an e-mail can reasonably
expect that the contents will remain private and free from police intrusion,
absent a search warrant supported by probable cause." On the other hand,
"chat" messages,78 received e-mails, 79 forwarded e-mails, 0 and e-mails
divulged to third parties"' afford no reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus,
in order to implicate the Fourth Amendment, it is necessary to determine how,
when, where, and to whom the e-mail was sent.
III. ANALYSIS
"Down With Big Brother
' ' 2
The year 1984 has come and passed, and yet an Orwellian-type regime has
failed to materialize.' Nevertheless, technology has, as Justice Brandeis
eloquently stated in 1928, continued to advance to the point where a
government, or an individual for that matter, can now penetrate our private
writings without opening a drawer."' Yet the courts have concluded that society
is prepared to submit to minimal intrusions forthe sake of the collective good. s
The issue is therefore the degree of Carnivore's intrusiveness.
Theoretically, Carnivore or a similar device may intrude upon a Fourth
Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy in the following two ways:
(1) by uncovering too much personal information while being used as a pen-
trap device pursuant to the Electronic Communication Privacy Act of 1986
(ECPA)8 and (2) by the software's inherent potential for abuse. In addition to
75. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that
an employee, in a tort action against an employer, has no reasonable expectation that e-mails sent
to a supervisor via the company e-mail system will not be intercepted by management, despite
assurances to the contrary).
76. See United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177, 1184 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
77. Id.
78. United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,419 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
79. Id.
80. Id.
8 1. See Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184; see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293,
302 (1966) (finding that Fourth Amendment fails to protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that
a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it").
82. ORwELL, supra note 8, at 16.
83. Id. at 14.
84. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
85. See supra Part II.B.
86. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (1994).
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potentially violating the Fourth Amendment, Carnivore's use may not be
authorized by the relaxed standards of the ECPA. Therefore, to address the
broad issue of whether Carnivore is unreasonably intrusive, this Comment
focuses on three specific issues: (1) whether the pen-trap mode is authorized
under the ECPA; (2) whether Carnivore violates a Fourth Amendment
reasonable expectation of privacy while operating in pen-trap mode because it
over-collects and can easily be misused; and (3) whether Carnivore violates a
Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy because of its inherent
potential for abuse.
A. Is the ECPA Broad Enough to Encompass E-Mail?
The ECPA governs the issuance and use of "pen-trap" devices. 7 A pen
register is a device that "records the numbers dialed on a telephone" but does
not record the content of the phone call." A trap and trace device is similar to
a caller-ID system; it records incoming telephone numbers.89 In Smith v.
Maryland9° the United States Supreme Court held that the use of a pen register
device does not require a search warrant because an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed from her telephone.9
The Court reasoned that telephone subscribers must realize the company has
the ability to record all dialed numbers, for "they see a list of their long-
distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills."'
FBI officials have concluded that when Carnivore is modified to limit the
collection of content, the ECPA grants the FBI pen-trap authorization to use
Carnivore to collect TO and FROM information such as an e-mail address from
a suspect's Internet account. 93 Thus, the FBI apparently reasons that a
telephone number is sufficiently similar to information sent or received via an
Internet account. This reasoning, however, stretches the boundaries of statutory
interpretation. 94
The use of Carnivore does not fit into the statutory language found in the
ECPA.9s This lack of express statutory authorization is important because if the
ECPA fails to authorize the use of Carnivore, the Government will likely need
87. Id.
88. See United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161 n.I (1977); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 3127.
89. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450,454 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
90. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
91. Id. at 742.
92. Id.
93. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127; see HTRI REPORT, supra note 5, at 3-1 to 3-2.
94. See Ted Bridis, FBIs E-Mail Suggests Divisions On Legality of Web Surveillance,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2000, at B9 (noting a candid e-mail obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act revealed confusion among at least some FBI agents regarding whether the pen-
trap laws were applicable to Carnivore).
95. The IITRI report even mentioned that "the language in the pen trap provisions arguably
does not clearly apply to electronic communication." HTRI REPORT, supra note 5, at 3-2.
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to convince a court that, despite the language of the statute, the device still does
not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy when used in pen-trap mode. In
other words, notwithstanding the ECPA, the Government will likely argue that
an individual possesses no legitimate expectation of privacy in the e-mail
addresses she sends or receives.
Under the ECPA a pen register is defined as a device that identifies "the
numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which such
device is attached."' The statute further defines a trap and trace device as a
device that identifies "the originating number of an instrument or device from
which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted."97 Carnivore,
however, does not record telephone numbers, nor is it attached to a telephone
line; rather, it records addressing information, such as e-mail addresses, and is
attached to an ISP.9" Additionally, an e-mail address is unlike a phone number.
E-mail addresses provide a greater amount of information than does a mere
phone number9
Furthermore, Congress enacted the Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA),' ° which "requires telecommunications
carriers and equipment manufacturers to build into their networks technical
capabilities to assist law enforcement... ."'0' CALEA thus requires phone
companies to possess infrastructure that can support surveillance tools such as
pen-trap devices. Although CALEA is separate from the ECPA, which
allegedly authorizes Carnivore's pen-trap mode, both acts regulate pen-trap
devices." In interpreting CALEA, the court in United States Telecom
Association v. FCC'03 concluded that "CELEA does not cover 'information
services' such as e-mail and internet access.""' Because CELEA has not been
extended to cover e-mail addresses, it seems likely that the ECPA will be
interpreted in a similar way.
Therefore, the ECPA fails to authorize the use of Carnivore. Congress
drafted the ECPA in 1986 when the idea of e-mail communication was in its
nascent stages." 5 The ECPA is too narrow to encompass e-mail surveillance
because an e-mail address is not a telephone number, nor is it sufficiently
similar to such a number. Unless and until Congress passes a statute that
96. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (emphasis added).
97. Id. § 3127(4) (emphasis added).
98. See PRIVACY FOUND., LEGAL ANALYSIS IN RESPONSE TO THE IITRI REPORT ON
CARNivoRE, at http://www.privacyfoundation.org/pdf/CamivLT.pdf oastvisited Jan. 17,2001).
99. This argument will be explored further in Part III.B of this Comment.
100. 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994).
101. United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 277 F.3d 450,454 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
102. 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(2)(B).
103. 277 F.3d at 450.
104. Id. at 455. It should be noted that the court concluded this point in dicta and
interpreted the words "information services" as including e-mail and internet access. Id.; see also
47 U.S.C. § 1002(b)(2)(A).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3127.
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addresses e-mail and Internet surveillance, authorization of pen-mode operation
should require a Title I court order.'"
B. Does Carnivore's "Pen-Trap"Mode Collect Too Much Information?
Even if the ECPA could be interpreted to implicitly authorize Carnivore's
pen-mode operation, the scope of the information Carnivore collects violates
the Fourth Amendment's reasonable expectation of privacy requirement. As
discussed in Part II, Carnivore has two modes of operation: pen-trap or full
content. Pursuant to wiretapping laws, the legal threshold for obtaining a Title
I full content search is more demanding than that required for installing a pen-
trap pursuant to the ECPA.' 7 In order to tap a phone conversation pursuant to
Title III, an agency must obtain a warrant based upon probable cause.' °s In
contrast, to install a pen-trap device pursuant to the ECPA, an agent merely
must certify that "the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing
criminal investigation... ." Thus, the FBI ultimately has a lower threshold
to meet if it only operates Carnivore in pen-trap mode. This distinction should
not be minimized, for if snooper software over-collects information while
operating pursuant to pen-trap authorization, the FBI circumvents the
requirements of a Title Ill court order."0
When Carnivore operates in pen-trap mode, it violates an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy in three ways. First, it collects more than
mere addressing information."' When operating in pen-trap mode, Carnivore
captures e-mail addresses sent to and from the suspect's Internet account." 2
While pen-trap mode does not collect the subject heading or content of an e-
mail, it does collect the number of bytes transferred in the message." 3 The
software represents a unit of data with an "X" in the subject field."' Thus, an
e-mail sent containing seventeen bytes of data is represented by eighteen Xs,
while an e-mail containing twenty-nine bytes of data is represented by thirty
Ms." 5 This data may seem insignificant, but consider the following
106. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520.
107. See United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450,453 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
108. Before authorizing a wiretap, ajudge must find the following: (1) there is probable
cause that the suspect committed or will commit a crime; (2) there is probable cause to believe
that communications concerning the crime will be obtained through interception; (3) normal
investigative procedures have failed, will likely fail, or are too dangerous; and (4) there is
probable cause to believe that facilities to be tapped are being used or about to be used to in
connection with a specific crime. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3).
109. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2).
110. See supra note 108.
111. IITRI REPORT, supra note 5, at C-3.
112. Id. at viii.
113. Id. at C-3 ("Recording this information might be an issue of over-collecting because
the court order only authorizes collecting e-mail from and to addresses.").
114. Id.
115. Id.
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hypothetical: Ajudge authorizes FBI agents to use Carnivore to capture e-mail
addresses sent to and from a person suspected of violating child pornography
laws. While the agents are viewing this information, they notice most messages
are small but some are extraordinarily large, perhaps indicating that illegal
pictures are being transmitted. Therefore, in some cases the FBI has the ability
to ascertain, or at least accurately guess, the nature of an e-mail without first
obtaining Title III authorization. If the FBI uses Carnivore as a pen-trap device,
the software should at least be configured to capture addressing information
only.
Second, the e-mail addressing information is more personal, and thus more
revealing, than a phone number. An e-mail address may specifically identify
an individual (for example, JohnDoe@aol.com) or at least refer to him in a
personal, idiosyncratic manner (for example, BigJohn@aol.com.). A phone
number, on the other hand, provides no personal information other than the
location from which the phone call was placed. Granted, the FBI can obtain
information beyond a mere number by using a tool such as a reverse phone
book. However, this additional information will only indicate where the call
was placed and who paid the phone bill. It will not necessarily disclose who
placed the call. For example, John Doe places a call from work, but FBI agents,
using a pen register device on the phone line, may know only that a call was
placed from a particular building." 6 However, if the agents were tracing e-mail
addresses, they might ascertain that the message was sent from
JohnDoe@work.com."
17
In addition, an e-mail address is more personal than a phone number
because that individual has chosen the name for a reason. Perhaps John has a
racy side that he only reveals to intimate friends. Thus, he may have an e-mail
account which he generally uses, but he may also have an account with a name
such as SexyJohn@aol.com. He only uses the latter e-mail account when
communicating with certain individuals, wishing to keep this username private
from others. In this instance, it is clear how an e-mail address can contain more
private information than information accessed with a telephone number.
Because an e-mail address is more revealing than a telephone number,
obtaining a list of e-mail usernames-many, if not most, of which may belong
116. This hypothetical assumes that John Doe's place of work does not provide personal
phone numbers for its employees.
117. For the sake of argument, individuals other than John Doe may actually use the same
e-mail address. However, due to an Internet user's relative ease in obtaining a personal e-mail
address (for example, setting up a Hotmail account), as opposed to the cost of setting up a
personal phone line, it is probably safe to assume that sharing phone numbers is a more common
practice than sharing e-mail addresses. See Microsoft, Hotmail Registration, MSN Hotmail, at
http://lcl.lawl3.hotnail.passport.com/cgi-bin/register?_lang=EN (requiring the following to set
up an e-mail account: (1) Internet access from any computer, (2) submission of a name, address,
gender, birthday, and occupation; and (3) the selection of a password). Indeed, some people who
actually share e-mail addresses may indicate this fact in their username (for example,
JohnandJaneDoe@aol.com).
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to innocent parties-should not be permitted under the relaxed standards of the
ECPA. If Carnivore is operated in pen-trap mode, its scope should be limited
to collecting only numerical addressing information such as an IP address." 8
This mode of operation is more closely analogous to operating a pen-trap
device on a phone line because only numbers are recorded.
Finally, even assuming arguendo that the ECPA authorizes Carnivore's
pen-mode operation, the potential for misuse exists. The software is capable of
being improperly calibrated and intercepting more information than is lawfully
permitted." 9 One of the problems with Carnivore is that both the pen-trap mode
and full-content mode are operated using the same software. 2 Indeed, the
ITRI report even noted the possible ramifications of this setup: "There
is... the possibility of unintentional error; for example, clicking the radio
button for full collection when the operator meant to click the radio button next
to it for pen-trap collection..'' Perhaps even more remarkable is that there is
"no mechanism for detecting or minimizing the likelihood of such an
unintentional setup .... ."" Because the government bears a greater burden
when obtaining consent for a full content search under Title III, the current
pen-trap mode software should be at least separated from the full-content
capture software in order to prevent accidental over-collection. Such
separation would help eliminate the chance of an accidental or intentional full-
content search being performed under mere pen-trap authorization.
Furthermore, passwords and authorizations should be different for the separated
devices, thereby further removing the possibility of error.
In conclusion, Title III authorization should be required for Carnivore's
pen-mode operation because Carnivore collects too much information in this
mode. " Additionally, an e-mail address is generally identified in connection
with an individual, whereas a phone number is more connected to a location.
Therefore, an individual possesses a greater expectation of privacy in the e-mail
addresses she sends than in the phone numbers she dials. 6 Finally, even
assuming statutory authorization, separate software should exist for the pen and
full-content modes because the software is capable of being accidentally or
118. See MARK A. LEMLEY ET AL., SoFrwARE AND INTERNET LAW 1094 (2000) (defining
an IP address as a "numerical identification [such as 1.206.40.130] used to locate a specific
computer on the Intemet").
119. IITRI REPORT, supra note 5, at 4-4.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 4-10
122. Id.
123. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520.
124. The IITRI Report was sufficiently concerned with accidental over-collection that it
recommended separate versions of Carnivore for pen-trap and full content. IITRI REPORT, supra
note 5, at xiv.
125. See supra notes I 11-15 and accompanying text.
126. See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
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intentionally configured to collect full content when only pen-trap collection
was authorized.'
27
C. E-Mail Snooping and the Potential for Abuse
[A]s soon as electronic surveillance comes into
play . . [t]here is no security from that kind of
eavesdropping, no way ofmitigating the risk, and so not even
a residuum oftrueprivacy.... Electronic aids add a wholly
new dimension to eavesdropping. They make it more
penetrating, more indiscriminate, more truly obnoxious to a
free society. '"
As noted in Part II, in order to have a reasonable expectation of privacy,
the individual must possess a subjective expectation of privacy that society
deems reasonable.'25 However, despite an expectation of privacy, a search is
reasonable if a strong government interest outweighs an individual's privacy
interest. 30 Although an individual possesses a legitimate, albeit diminished,
expectation of privacy when sending e-mails, Carnivore's use is reasonable if
a governmental interest outweighs an individual's privacy interest in
cyberspace.' On the other hand, Carnivore's use may be inherently intrusive,
meaning its very nature intrudes upon all communications passing through the
targeted data access point. Therefore, the issue becomes whether an e-mail
snooping device capable of being abused is ever reasonable, especially in light
of potentially less intrusive alternatives. In other words, is Carnivore inherently
too intrusive?
The FBI's current surveillance technology does not foreshadow the coming
ofthe thought police, norwill our communications be relegated to newspeak.'3 2
Indeed, the Carnivore technology is incapable of making broad sweeps of the
entire Internet because the software can monitor only a small group of Internet
users for an extended time, or a large group for a short time. 3 a In fact, if
Carnivore were set to collect all traffic on a link, the 2-Gbyte Jaz disk would
be full in eleven minutes.'34 Even if the FBI decided to use an enormous 60-
Gbyte disk, it would be full in approximately five to six hours.'35 Furthermore,
the FBI currently only taps into a single access point on the ISP's network. This
127. See ITRI REPORT, supra note 5, at xiv (recommending separate versions of
Carnivore).
128. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,465-66 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
129. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
130. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985).
131. See supra Part ll.B.
132. See ORWELL, supra note 8.
133. IITRI REPORT, supra note 5, at 4-4.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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access point will contain only a percentage of the traffic on the ISP's servers.'36
Finally, "Carnivore cannot... [b]lock any traffic on the network... [s]eize
control of any portion of Internet traffic... [or] [s]hut down or shut off the
communications of any person, web site, company, or ISP."'37
Despite the fact that Carnivore will not be used to implement an Orwellian
regime, the possibility of abuse still exists. For example, (1) overzealous agents
or negligent operators may set parameters to collect more information than is
subject to a court order; (2) the software is capable of broad sweeps on the
access point and, incorrectly configured, can record any traffic it encounters; 1
39
(3) the software has no mechanism for detecting orminimizing setup error, thus
abuse can go undetected and uncorrected; 4' and (4) in the worst case scenario,
a rogue FBI agent could use the software to spy on anyone from a suspected
criminal to a lover.' 4' A reasonable expectation of privacy, however, must
contend with the changing nature of our technological society. 42 Thus, the
nature of the Internet itself may diminish an individual's privacy interest. 43 In
order to determine whether Carnivore's inherent potential for abuse will always
make its use unreasonable, it is necessary to apply a Fourth Amendment
balancing test that weighs the government's interest in using Carnivore against
an Internet user's right to be left alone.
The government's interest behind Carnivore includes the FBI's desire to
combat terrorism, computer crime, child pornography, and other felonies
conducted or facilitated via the Internet.'" This is certainly a strong, although
broad, interest. However, just as the nature of the Intemet may lessen an
individual's interest, the government's compelling need also must be
diminished by the nature of the Intemet For example, the IITRI report
concluded that Carnivore "[c]an be countered with simple, public-domain
encryption."'' If the FBI is targeting criminals such as terrorists, informational
warriors, and hackers, then certainly these relatively sophisticated criminals
would have the foresight to purchase encryption software, making Carnivore
136. See Chart Description, supra note 3. The FBI's website did not indicate what
percentage of traffic will flow on a given access point, but it did indicate the FBI attempts to
filter through as little traffic as possible. Id. The FBI claims that an ISP is often able to provide
an access point containing only the suspect's transmissions. Id. However, "Carnivore can... in
court authorized counter-cyber-terrorism activities, scan a subset of network traffic." IITRI
REPORT, supra note 5, at 4-4.
137. IITRI REPORT, supra note 5, at xiv.
138. Id. at 3-5 ("[T]he potential for human error cannot be discounted-agents must
program Carnivore to match the potentially ambiguous information in the court order.").
139. Id. at 4-10.
140. Id.
141. Id. (noting that this type of abuse was beyond the scope of the IITRI report).
142. Sundby, supra note 37, at 1758.
143. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
144. See Carnivore Diagnostic Tool, supra note 9.
145. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
146. JITRI REPORT, supra note 5, at 4-8.
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completely ineffective as a tool to interpret their communication.147 As a result,
the Carnivore software can only target a smaller percentage of criminals using
the Internet."" Because Carnivore's effectiveness can be countered by
sophisticated criminals, the government's interest is diminished.
On the other hand, the government has a strong interest in effective law
enforcement. Using the Carnivore technology is an efficient way to implement
e-mail surveillance, especially in the case of national security under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). 149 For example, if the software
is currently being used under a court order, and the suspect sends an e-mail
indicating imminent danger such as a bomb, the FBI can quickly intercept the
targeted e-mail communication and react appropriately. 5° However, "the mere
fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never itself justify
disregard of the Fourth Amendment..'' Carnivore's efficiency should,
therefore, be measured against current procedures to obtain e-mail, such as
issuing a court order to an ISP, who either (1) turns over the contents of a
suspect's communications that are stored on the server or (2) creates a clone e-
mail account for the FBI's use."'2 Relying on this method could result in a loss
of evidence if the content has already been deleted from the server; however,
this risk alone should not justify installing a device on an ISP's server,
especially when the software's potential for abuse threatens all who share the
same data point with the suspect. Therefore, the FBI should refrain from using
the device except under the most exceptional circumstances, with the possible
exception of a national emergency or a threat to national security. If the FBI
does receive authorization to use the software, its use should be limited to the
briefest possible amount of time reasonably required to achieve its goal. Such
constraints would help to diminish the fear that Big Brother is watching.
Weighed against the government interest is the individual's interest.
Although "absolute privacy in modem society is simply unattainable unless one
lives the life of a recluse," ' one certainly expects that her personal
147. The Carnivore software itself cannot decrypt, but the FBI agents can attempt to
decrypt after the encrypted data has been collected. Id. at 3-5 to -6.
148. The scope of this Comment is too narrow to discuss implications of FBI decrypting
and the procedures and process this would require.
149. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811.
150. See IITRI REPORT, supra note 5 at 3-4. Because a field agent may immediately
proceed to authorize collection without waiting forjudicial approval, the FBI would not have to
wait for the ISP to respond to the court order and release information stored on its server. Id.
151. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978). Mincey concerned the issue of
warrantless searches. Id. at 388. The Court's reasoning that efficiency is not a justification to
disregard the warrant clause is equally persuasive in determining whether the efficiency of
Carnivore helps to justify its use. Id. at 393. Cf United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284
(1983) ("We have never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality .....
152. IITRI REPORT, supra note 5, at 3-4.
153. See Ashdown, supra note 49, at 1315-16; see also Sundby, supra note 37, at 1758-59
('Technological and communication advances mean that much of everyday life is now recorded
by someone somewhere, whether it be credit records, banking records, phone records, tax
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communications will remain reasonably private. 54 Expectations of privacy
while using the Internet, however, are mixed and often seemingly
contradictory. On the one hand, most individuals are aware that their computer
is subject to intrusion by hackers, cookies, or otherwise. 5 ' Indeed, the sale of
"firewalls" to protect invasions and encryption software to prevent disclosure
indicate that individuals know that using the Internet may require prophylactic
measures to protect their privacy." Thus, an individual's expectation of
privacy is somewhat diminished due to the inherent openness of the Internet.
On the other hand, an individual may feel more secure on the Internet than she
would otherwise. After all, one of the benefits of the Internet is anonymity, or
at least subjective anonymity. 157 Many people enjoy the free expression found
in chat rooms, where individual expression is less inhibited because
communication is monitor-to-monitor rather than face-to-face. 58 Moreover, the
popularity of online shopping provides another example of expectations of
anonymity. Thus, individuals may feel more comfortable ordering goods via
an anonymous order form, rather than revealing information such as their waist
size, taste in music, or choice of lingerie to a salesperson at the store or on the
phone.
Individuals also have a strong interest in preventing a "chilling effect" on
their communications. Indeed, individuals may actually feel the FBI is
intruding upon their privacy, even when no such intrusion actually occurs.
After all, an individual's feeling of security is based upon her perception of
privacy. Ifa person feels she is being watched, then she may decide not to send
an e-mail she otherwise would have sent. In other words, Carnivore "chills"
free communication.
To illustrate this chilling concept, consider the following hypothetical
proposed by Professor Lloyd Weinreb:'59 Weinreb considered the effect of
deploying surveillance cameras capable of monitoring every segment of
Central Park in New York City.' 6 Certainly crime would evaporate, but at a
cost.16 ' As a result of such monitoring, ordinary people would be inhibited from
using the park, for fear that whatever they did, however innocent, might
records, or even the videos we rent.").
154. See supra Part lH.B.
155. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STANL. REV. 1193,
1196-97 (1998) (citing a study by Alan Westin, a privacy scholar, finding that eighty-nine
percent of individuals polled in the United States were concerned about their privacy).
156. One seller of firewalls has the slogan, "We SECURE the Internet." Checkpoint
Software Technologies, at http://www.checkpoint.com/ (last visited Mar. 27,2001).
157. See Jonathan D. Wallace, Nameless in Cyberspace: Anonymity on the Internet, CATO
BRIEFINGPAPERS, Dec. 8,1999, at6, availableathttp://www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp.054es.html.
158. Of course, some people are concerned that anonymous speech is more dangerous on
the Internet because of lack of accountability. Id. at 5.
159. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CmI. L. REv. 47
(1974).
160. Id. at 82.
161. Id.
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embarrass them if captured by television.62 Weinreb's hypothetical can be
analogized to e-mail surveillance. For instance, if people perceived that their
e-mails might be read by the government, this alone might inhibit them from
sending e-mails of a highly personal nature. The potenteial chilling effect on
speech is an important factor to consider when weighing the individual's
interest. E-mail use has skyrocketed in the last decade. 63 Because this is a
growing and efficient medium of communication, any external effects which
may hinder its use should be closely scrutinized.
Finally, the nature of the software may weigh in favor of the individual.
Software is capable of evolving at a rapid pace." Indeed, what was formerly
known as "Carnivore," when implemented, will likely be an updated version
of the software reviewed by the IITRI Report team. Therefore, who monitors
the software? Who ensures that the software is not tweaked to intercept data
that previously could not be intercepted by Carnivore? Perhaps the FBI
programmers will change the program in a good-faith belief that they have
statutory authority to broaden the software's interception capabilities. The
IITRI report even concluded there are inherent risks in deploying Carnivore. 6 '
The report recommended that there be "formal development processes to
improve traceability of requirements, improve configuration management, and
reduce potential errors in future versions of Carnivore.'
In conclusion, Carnivore is an effective and efficient means of assisting the
FBI in gathering evidence necessary to prosecute criminals. However, often
with the good comes the bad, and Carnivore has side effects which can
adversely impact the way an individual uses e-mail. In this regard, Carnivore
is inherently intrusive even though the degree of intrusiveness is limited due to
the restricted scope of the software. 67 Nevertheless, in light of less intrusive
alternatives, 6 ' but with the possible exception of a national emergency, the use
of Carnivore unreasonably intrudes upon a Fourth Amendment expectation of
privacy.
IV. CONCLUSION
The unique nature of e-mail presents challenges to law enforcement
agencies interested in surveilling this medium of communication. The FBI
developed Carnivore in order to facilitate the collection of this electronic
162. Id.
163. See Brief ofAmicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation at 5, Intel, Inc. v. Hamidi,
No. C033076 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), available at http://www.intelhamidi.com/amicusbrief.htm
(citing an E-Marketer report that noted eighty-one million Americans use e-mail, and between
September 1998 and November 1999, the number of e-mail boxes grew by sixty-six percent).
164. See LEmLEY ET AL., supra note 118, at 30.
165. See IITRI REPORT, supra note 5, at xiv.
166. Id. atxv.
167. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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evidence. An individual, however, possesses a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the e-mails she sends. Carnivore violates this expectation by over-
collecting information in pen-trap mode and by its inherent potential for abuse.
Additionally, the FBI is currently operating in pen-trap mode under
questionable statutory authority. Sergeant McGruff tells us to "[t]ake a bite out
of Crime."' 69 Carnivore may indeed help take abite out of crime; unfortunately,
however, Carnivore's large appetite for devouring crime is supplemented by
healthy doses of individual expectations of privacy. When an animal's large
appetite causes it to become a threat to humans, it should be put back in the pen
or left alone in the wild. Similarly, unless and until the intrusiveness of
Carnivore's appetite can be curbed, it should be put back in its cage, only to be
removed in case of national emergency.
Manton M. Grier, Jr.
169. See Nat'l Crime Prevention Counsel, McGruffs 20th Anniversary Tour Cities, at
http://www.ncpc.org/tour2O/eia.htm (last modified Nov. 11, 2000).
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